Abstract
Introduction
A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext under delegator's pub-lickey into a delegatee's ciphertext on the same message by using some additional information. This concept is proposed by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [2] , and formalized later by Ateniese et al. [1] . PRE schemes have been found useful in many applications, such as e-mail forwarding, lawenforcement monitoring, and content distribution.
Recently, Canetti and Hohenberger [5] described a construction of proxy re-encryption providing chosen-ciphertext security according to an appropriate definition of PRE systems. In contrast to the previous work, their scheme relies on the fact that the proxy key can be used to translate ciphertexts from delegatee to delegator, hence this is called bidirectional (cf. unidirectional scheme that was originally proposed in the model by Blaze et al. [2] ). Till then, there was no known unidirectional PRE systems with chosen-ciphertext security that rely on the standard model. To fill this gap, Libert and Vergnaud [11] presented the first construction of unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme with chosen ciphertext security in the standard model. Nonetheless, they left an open problem on how to capture a scenario where adversaries are allowed to generate public keys on behalf of corrupted parties (possibly non-uniformly or as a function of honest parties' public keys). This is a daunting problem where the adversaries can generate any public keys on behalf of the corrupted parties, and Libert and Vergnaud's scheme [11] cannot deter against this attack.
Motivation of This Work. Although Libert and Vergnaud' scheme [11] PRE scheme is very elegant, there are several unsolved issues with regards to the security of PRE that are outlined as follows.
In [11] , the adversaries are not permitted to generate public keys on behalf of the corrupted parties. One possible solution to prevent this attack is to require users to prove their knowledge of secret keys during the registration phase. Nonetheless, this approach requires zero-knowledge proof system, which may not be desirable in several applications. In contrast to this approach, we take a different direction in this work. We incorporate a trusted party with a system secret key. When the user selects its public key, the trusted party runs the key generation algorithm with the system secret key together with the user's public key, and the user's secret key then will be generated for the user. A new problem with this approach is that the attacker in this model has to share its secret key with the third party, which will be quite natural. Since relative to Libert and Vergnaud's security model, the challenger is required to generate all public keys for all parties and allow the adversary to obtain private keys for some of these users.
Furthermore, Libert and Vergnaud only considered a static corruption model, in which the challenger generates public keys for all parties. Proving security against adaptive corruptions is a challenging and daunting task. Finally, Libert and Vergnaud only provided a scheme in a selective public key model, where the target (challenge) public key has to be determined by the challenger at the beginning of the game. A possible enhancement is to allow adversaries to adaptively query the target public key at the challenge phase within the set of honest players, which we refer to as the full public key model. Our Contributions. In this paper, we address the problem of constructing a PRE in the full public key, adaptive corruption model and to allow the adversaries to generate public keys on behalf of corrupted parties. Specifically, we show that Libert and Vergnaud's scheme is insecure against chosen public key attack. We note that although our attack is not applicable to the original model presented by Libert and Vergnaud's [11] , our attack is very natural and applicable in practice. Then, we provide a formal definition of PRE-CPCA game, in which the adversary can chose any public key freely. We also present a new construction of chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption schemes which are PRE-CPCA secure in the standard model. [5] presented a construction of CCA secure bidirectional PRE scheme. Later, Libert and Vergnaud [11] presented a CCA secure unidirectional PRE scheme from bilinear pairings. Recently, Deng et al. [8] proposed a CCA secure bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings. In Pairing'08, Libert and Vergnaud [12] introduced the notion of traceable proxy reencryption, where malicious proxies leaking their re-encryption keys can be identified.
Since in PKI-based setting, it is needed to distribute public key certificates, the work [10, 7, 15] extended the above notion to identity-based proxy re-encryption (IB-PRE). Due to the fact that pairing computation is a costly expensive operation, the subsequent work [8, 16, 14] studied PRE schemes to be constructed without bilinear pairings, especially in computation resource limited settings.
Definitions
In this section, we first review the complexity assumption required in our schemes, and then provide the definition and security of a proxy re-encryption scheme. 
Bilinear Maps

Proxy Re-encryption
In the following, we will provide the definition of a PRE scheme and its game-based security definition.
Definition 1 (Proxy Re-encryption).
A proxy re-encryption scheme comprises the following algorithms: 
-Decryption level 1 query (1) , ii pk C and (
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, ii pk C ) is the level 2 ciphertext derivatives of ( Comparing our scheme with Libert and Vergnaud's model [11] , our security model outperforms Libert and Vergnaud's scheme in the following aspects:
-In our security model, the adversaries are permitted to generate public keys on behalf of the corrupted parties. -Furthermore, Libert and Vergnaud only considered a static corruption model, in which the challenger generates public keys for all parties. In contrast, our model allows the adversary to adaptively determine which parties will be compromised. -Finally, Libert and Vergnaud only provided a scheme in a selective public key model, where the target (challenge) public key has to be determined by the challenger at the beginning of the game. In contrast, in our model, the adversary can determine the target (challenge) public key at anytime.
Chosen Public Key Attack on Libert and Vergnaud' PRE
Libert and Vergnaud [11] presented the first construction of unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme with chosen ciphertext security in the standard model. Their system is a reminiscent of the public key cryptography system obtained by applying the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform to the second selective-ID secure identity-based encryption scheme described in [3] . Unfortunately, as they claimed, their scheme does not capture a scenario where adversaries generate public keys on behalf of corrupt parties. In this section, we will firstly review their scheme and show the chosen public key attack subsequently. The idea of the attack is as follows.
In Libert-Vergnaud's scheme [11] We note that this attack is not captured in the original model of Libert-Vergnaud's scheme [11] . Nonetheless, our attack is very natural and realistic in this scenario.
Our Construction
In this section, we present our CPCA secure PRE scheme from the q − ABDHE assumption. The idea of our scheme is based on the exponent inversion IBE scheme proposed by Gentry [9] .
Our PRE Scheme
We will first describe our scheme, and follow with the description on the properties later. 
Re 2( , )
On input a level 2 re-encryption key (2) ij rk  , and a level 2 ciphertext
, and re-encrypt the ciphertext to be under identity j pk as:
ii DecLev C sk : On input a secret key
and any level 1 ciphertext 
Security of Our PRE
In this subsection, we prove the CPCA security for our scheme without any random oracle. Our PRE scheme works in an adaptive corruption model in which the adversary has to determine the corrupted parties (Key Generation query) adaptively and choice the public key as her will when making the key generation query. Additionally, we also allow the adversary to adaptively query a reencryption oracle and decryption oracles. 
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